




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CERTIFICATION IN AGRI-FOOD CHAINS: CAN IT REALLY HELP UNFAIR TRADE?

RAFAEL MEDEIROS HESPANHOL

Unfair trade is a problem that has been around for a long time, especially when we talk about agri-food supply chains involving underdeveloped countries. Because of that, many different and uncoordinated initiatives have been tried in different places. Among them, there are the global certifications like UTZ, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance. In this research, we aimed to analyze why certifications are not always the best solution when we think about underdeveloped countries. The research analyzed studies done in multiple underdeveloped countries to understand if certifications fit every situation in agri-food chains. The research was limited to the coffee agri-food chain, during the last twenty years. Some studies suggest that implementing certification schemes provide positive social results, greater earnings, and reduce poverty for various farmer profiles (Maguire-Rajpaul, Rajpaul, McDermott & Pinto, 2020; Mitiku, de Mey, Nyssen, & Maertens, 2017). However, these effects are normally related to greater prices, and in some certifications, like Fairtrade, this premium may not cause significant domestic revenue impacts because of what is expended throughout the process (Mitiku, de Mey, Nyssen, & Maertens, 2017; Sidwell, 2008). Research done in different places suggest that the value disparity among Fairtrade and noncertified farmers seems to be unimportant (Jena, Stellmacher, & Grote, 2017; Lampach & Morawetz, 2016). Certification isolated cannot enhance producers' welfare because freshly certified producers will grind down revenue for the whole (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013). Some studies show that coffee certification is not always the solution to improve smallholder coffee revenue. However, in case of exceptionally low coffee prices, they might act like a safeguard (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013). Certifications normally differ according to the business model of cooperatives (Beuchelt & Zeller, 2013) and these cooperatives are institutionally heterogeneous (Lampach & Morawetz, 2016). The impact in the welfare of small-scale farmers relies on this combination (Mitiku, de Mey, Nyssen, & Maertens, 2017). It is important to diminish unfair trade, especially in agri-food chains. However, to think that only certification is enough to solve that, looks too be a too simple solution. The reasons for unfair trade are structural and involve too many variables. We are talking about an institutional problem, so coordination and governance are essential to get better results.

HUAWEI EXPANSION: HOW INSTITUTIONS DETERMINED ITS LIMITS

RAFAEL MEDEIROS HESPANHOL

Huawei is a global telecommunications and networking gear business headquartered in Shenzhen City, Guangdong Province, China. Established in 1987, Huawei has become a global firm with trades volume of over \$70 billion, with business presence in more than 170 nations (Alkhawajah, 2019). Huawei formatted itself in a unique way to expand. The company managed to create a corporate culture that enables the Chinese company to get rid of the prejudgements from customers from the western world about the way business are done in China (De Cremer, 2018; Micheli & Carrillo, 2016). It is almost like Huawei strategy was perfect for a company that aims to be global. The problems that Huawei sees on its expansion, however, is too big to the company to deal with. This research aimed to discover strong and weak points about Huawei market expansion strategy, in order to understand what could have been done different in order to get better results. It was made an analysis of Huawei's performance, partnerships and news about its expansion in documents, bibliography and new from the last ten years (2010-2020). These documents were analyzed through the Resource-Based View and New Institutional Economics theories. US companies were banned from doing business with Huawei, meaning that designing and producing chips and other components for and with Huawei was not possible. The US wanted its allies to follow suit and remove the company from their 5G networks. In 2018, both Australia and New Zealand excluded the Chinese company from involvement in its future 5G network because they think the company may be trying to spy on them. The UK gave its operators a deadline to remove all Huawei equipment used in the 5G telecommunications infrastructure by the end of 2027. In January 2019, Vodafone stopped the use of its equipment in Spain because they had the same concerns about privacy and security. Once the company started being banned from some countries and some companies are prohibiting companies of partnering with Huawei, the game changed. Worries were raised, in multiple locations, that Huawei would be used by the Chinese government to spy on people, something the company denies. From a firm perspective, we can say that Huawei's strategy was very good. It is impressive how far they have reached and the potential that a company from a growing economy had. The institutional environment from which the company has its origins, however, proved to be a problem that is out of Huawei's hands.

WINE PRODUCTION IN NIAGARA: A REFERENCE IN SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION

RAFAEL MEDEIROS HESPANHOL

Mainstream economic theory has been complemented, in the last decades, for different approaches, such as New Institutional Economics (NIE). The goal at this research was to answer how can New Institutional Economics help to understand the role of Vintners Quality Alliance on Niagara's wine supply chain coordination. Williamson (1985) showed that institutions matter to economic theory, using transaction costs as the unit of analysis. This research used the transaction costs available in bibliographic and documental researches. Vintners Quality Alliance (VQA) set the framework for the production standards and established the appellations for wine growing. It is responsible for quality assurance and for creating knowledge and recognition about wine at the region. As a regulatory authority, we see that VQA aims to get consumers to understand the quality attributes. It helps diminishing the quasi-rent appropriation through measurement in a lower cost of Niagara wine. Williamson (1985, 1986) presents four different types of asset specificity, in which VQA also works: Site Specificity, when the place is critical, and the firm has great costs if it needs to move to another place; Physical Asset Specificity, that are investments made in some hardware; Human Asset Specificity, that is one of the most interesting and regards knowledge and experience from people, considering the impacts of investing money and time on this; and Dedicated Assets, that would be expanding investments considering some demand from a specific firm. NIE is very useful to understand supply chains, because of the institutional environment around it, the incentives that this environment do to firms, and how they are affected by these firms, something that is we see on the Niagara region wine supply chain history. Since the early history of grapes and wine in Niagara, we see that there were already some institutional factors are present. From the origins and first steps on wine production, informal and formal institutions are showed, through the influence of government regulation on the wine business. This explains why institutions matter, culminating on the establishment of Vintners Quality Alliance, on 1999, and its role on diminishing Transaction Costs and Measurement Costs. VQA has as objective to get more efficiency within the formal and informal institutional environment, as well as generate more value to the Niagara wine supply chain, through better product quality.